Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2017. xi, 264 pp. (B&W photos., illustrations.) US$60.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-8248-5594-9.
In Youth for Nation, Charles R. Kim traces the emergence of South Korean educated “youths,” namely high school and college students, as a crucial social force for modernization and democratization in the post-Korean War era. Kim argues that by championing the nation’s “student vanguard” as the future of the new nation-state, state ideologues and intellectuals inadvertently established the discursive stage for the first mass anti-government protest on April 19, 1960. A response to electoral and political abuses of the Syngman Rhee government, this protest, he claims, “marked the inception of the postcolonial protest culture that was at the center of the democracy movement of the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s” (214).
In illustrating students’ central position in South Korea’s social and political landscape, Kim highlights the constitution and transformation of two interrelated “discursive schemas” of thought about students. The first, “wholesome modernization,” connotes an “everyday” orientation that ties personal goals to national developments. The second, “the student vanguard” indicates an “extraordinary form,” whereby youth as “representatives and exemplars of the nation” are inclined “to engage in mass protest against the illegitimate state” (3; 140). This framework is supported by a detailed and contextualized analysis of intellectual and popular magazines, e.g. Sasanggye (World of thought) and Yŏwŏn (Women’s garden), as well as textbooks and educational materials, such as Hagwŏn (Student garden). The author also incorporates into his analysis films, such as Yu Kwansun and Nameless Stars that to date have received little scholarly attention.
Kim begins with a vivid description of the social milieu in which postwar Korean nation-building took place. He details the harsh economic realities as increasing numbers of Koreans migrated to urban centers. Against this backdrop, the discursive frame of “wholesome modernization” emerged as a conservative reaction to the ideals and norms of Euro-American culture (43). This discourse, Kim convincingly demonstrates, made postwar youth the central protagonist of nation-building, while at the same time preserving pre-1945 patriarchal family values (48). Within this framework, the education of the student vanguard became a high priority of state ideologues and intellectuals. Kim’s analysis of educational materials clearly shows a strong emphasis on moral instruction for students and the colonial roots of this moral education. But students did not simply absorb this postcolonial traditionalism, rather they recast anti-colonial resistance, such as the March First Incident in 1919 and the Kwangju Student Movement in 1929, to create a language and culture of postcolonial protest. By calling on public discourse that portrayed them as the “exemplars of the nation,” students were able to wage an “authorized” protest against the repressive measures of the Rhee regime that did not transgress accepted ideological and political boundaries (140). In short, because students drew on the official state discourse of democratic nation-building, the regime could not discredit the April Uprising as communist inspired. Kim also notes that in the wake of his 1961 coup, Park Chung-hee utilized the two interrelated discourses of wholesome modernization and the student vanguard to advance his economic development plan.
By showing that the April Uprising was “an unintended consequence of the state’s ideological mobilization of the student vanguard” in the 1950s, Kim points to the historical significance of an era that is often dismissed in scholarship on Korea as an era of crisis (10). Moreover, through his emphasis on the “transposition of anticolonial resistance into postcolonial politics,” the author draws a clear connection between the April Uprising and the culture of protests at the heart of democratization movements in the 1970s and 1980s (10). Thus, Youth for Nation would be an invaluable resource for scholars and students working on the social and cultural history of twentieth-century Korea.
Because Kim situates Korean protests within the framework of Cold War politics and the global 1960s, this book should also be of interest to historians of global history. Still, the book’s analytical framework remains largely national in scope. This nuanced and meticulously researched monograph might have been further enhanced if the author had embraced a more transnational approach that did not minimize the growing global-local connections and interactions, especially those between non-state actors. In downplaying these transnational interactions, the author missed the opportunity to analyze this critical legacy of the global 1960s.
Finally, Kim’s insightful narrative might also have been enhanced if he had supplemented his analysis of the state’s institutional indoctrination of youth with a careful consideration of other factors that shaped youth identity during this era. Undoubtedly, this generation’s childhood experiences of liberation and of the Korean War left an indelible mark on their identity and intellectual development. These children experienced firsthand the harsh realities associated with the struggle to survive in the aftermath of World War II. It also can be assumed that they witnessed violent ideological and physical conflicts that proved difficult for them to reconcile with the official discourse of democratic nation-building. Thus, it would have been helpful if the author had addressed how these lived experiences informed students’ reception of state ideology and contributed to the emergence of a culture of protest. These omissions aside, Kim’s study provides an astute analysis of the 1960 April Uprising and its impact on South Korea’s democratic trajectory in the 1970s and 1980s.
Ingu Hwang
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, USA