THE SINO-INDIAN RIVALRY: Implications for Global Order | By Šumit Ganguly, Manjeet S. Pardesi, and William R. Thompson

Šumit Ganguly, Manjeet S. Pardesi, and William R. Thompson are renowned scholars in the field of international relations studies. In their book, The Sino-Indian Rivalry: Implications for Global Order, the authors aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the “strategic rivalry” between China and India, which they describe as “one of the most consequential geopolitical contests in Asia today” (201). They examine the differing geopolitical, military, and economic perspectives of the rivalry and its implications for global order. The book focuses on regional subsystems, alliance processes, theories of general wars, great power politics, and Asian security. It also examines the spatial and positional contests characterizing the China-India rivalry and its interaction with the China-US rivalry. The authors explore the possibility of a systemic war resulting from the China-India rivalry for power and influence at the regional level in Asia (198, 204).

The Sino-Indian Rivalry argues that the China-India strategic rivalry has been relatively overlooked in academic scholarship, with too much emphasis on the spatial (or territorial) dimension of the rivalry and not enough attention paid to its positional dimension (3–4). The book’s chapters analyze a wide range of factors contributing to the development and constraints of the China-India rivalry, including the roles of asymmetries, triadic relations, and the international system. The authors stress the importance of the positional contest in the China-India rivalry, “even if the spatial element were to disappear” (11, 104, 203).

One of the key strengths of The Sino-Indian Rivalry is its exploration of the connection between the China-India strategic rivalry and global stability (202). The book predicts that the China-India rivalry is crucial for the regional order in Asia and for the global order (4–5, 13, 176). Based on the theories of general wars, the authors suggest that the growing strategic partnership between the United States and India, and the implications of the China-India rivalry for US positioning mean “the Sino-Indian rivalry is now a part of the larger mosaic of regional and global power competition” (205). The book also discusses the possibility that a Sino-Indian regional war may precipitate “a systemic crisis by involving the United States,” with scenarios of “a reasonable bet” such as “the disputed Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas or a Sino-Indian naval showdown in the Indian Ocean” (203, 205).

The Sino-Indian Rivalry asks important questions and offers a novel perspective on the origins, meanings, and implications of the China-India rivalry. The book brings us not only to an understanding of the evolution of the China-India rivalry, but also to a realization of how equally important it is to the global order. It provides detailed overviews of the historical context, and the analytical framework and conclusions should be considered seriously by scholars working in the field. While the book is provocative and some details may be open to challenge, it offers new perspectives that prompt important questions. This review covers only a portion of the issues raised in this book.

First,the authors emphasize “the role of asymmetries in rivalries” (8) and convincingly conclude that the China-India “asymmetries are shaping their conflict behavior” and “deserve special attention” (4). However, it is debatable whether such asymmetries are “novel.” The book provides an extensive discussion of the current asymmetries between China and India in terms of their economies, nuclear weapons, and naval power, but it provides little insight into India’s manipulation to exploit its advantageous positions in trade and geopolitics in order to maintain its major interests in Tibet. Indian enforcement of a trade “embargo” against Tibet in 1952 and in 1959, the PLA’s entry into Tibet and the outbreak of the Tibetan rebellion embody the nature of the China-India asymmetry, “giving India an exalted but much-resented position in China’s internal affairs” (10–11, 50–51).

Second, was India’s chief goal in Tibet the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy in the 1950s (72)? This needs to be discussed in more detail because it is one of the critical questions for understanding the roots of the China-India rivalry and even the 1962 war. Declassified archives from the Indian side demonstrate that India’s “most vital concern” in Tibet at that time was to safeguard its boundaries with Tibet. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Foreign Secretary K. P. S. Menon, and Ambassador K. M. Panikkar believed that maintaining the legitimacy of India’s northeast frontier, especially the “McMahon Line,” was the most vital interest. Indian troops occupied Tawang in February 1951 and the other areas south of the “McMahon Line” before 1954, the operations to fulfill New Delhi’s “chief goal,” creating a fait accompli of the boundary disputes that finally triggered the Border War in October 1962.

Third, the argument in The Sino-Indian Rivalry is reasonable in its assertion that one of China’s “two primary goals in South Asia” is “to prevent India from dominating South Asia,” but it should be cautious in concluding that China considers South Asia as its “back yard” (133–134). However, it is clear that South Asia is New Delhi’s “back yard,” as India has implemented its strategy to control the whole region since its independence and has become the de facto dominator. Further discussion is needed to determine China’s “primary goal” in South Asia. China’s grand strategy seems to involve diminishing India’s dominance by forming alliances and close relationships with Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.                                      

Chaowu Dai

Yunnan University, Kunming