Studies of the Contemporary Asia Pacific. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2021. xiii, 272 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures.) US$81.00, cloth. ISBN 9789888754021.
This book is the product of a conference held at the University of California, Berkeley, in March 2019, and updated (to varying degrees) through late 2020. The core theme is reflected in its title, the regional order that had characterized East Asia since the end of the Cold War has broken down, and nothing authoritative has replaced it. Instead, Sino-American rivalry is omnipresent in the region, challenging almost all regional institutions and practices. This theme is brought out in Lowell Dittmer’s introductory and concluding essays, and in nine articles, grouped into three sections of three essays on the themes of identity, strategy, and triangles. In the identities section, Yun-han Chu, Hsin-Che Wu, and Min-hua Huang write on the reception of China’s public diplomacy in Asia using Asian Barometer data; Jing Sun discusses how the Chinese public challenges the state’s foreign policymaking; and Jeremy Paltiel examines on the US and Chinese visions of world order as applied to Asia. In the strategies section, Ho-fung Hung makes a vigorous argument about China and the US in global capitalism and the fall of the “New World Order”; Guoguang Wu sees parallels between the Warring States era of Chinese history (475–221 BCE) and the contemporary situation in Asia; and Timothy R. Heath challenges the potentially negative projections of the literature on strategic rivalries as it may be applied to the US and China. In the triangles section, Yu-Shan Wu analyzes how the logics of strategic triangles might apply to smaller and medium-sized countries in East Asia; Dittmer writes on Southeast Asia among the powers; and Ming Wan focuses on the US-China-Japan strategic triangle. From this reviewer’s perspective, the essays by Hung, Heath, and Wu were the most stimulating.
Dittmer states that there have been two forms of international order since decolonization: “[D]efined order, which, absent any supreme authority, rests on consensual agreement among states as set forth in a treaty, compact, or other international accord; and emergent order, which arises from the pattern of interaction among states, typically forming some form of geostrategic power balance” (4). All the authors in this volume seem to follow the first definition or form of order. They see the post-Cold War order in East Asia breaking down, creating disorder. Yet one could argue that in fact, the second form of order exists, one where Sino-American rivalry and competition is a core process of the emergent order, with the US and China engaged in efforts to advance their interests in the region, and other regional states seeking room for relative autonomy and attempts to advance their interests. The contributors to this volume might disagree, countering that no geostrategic power balance has emerged. This is problematic in two ways. First, most of the essays in the volume are not looking at geostrategy, but at political economy (or geoeconomics) and societal values. Second, it leaves open the question of what constitutes a geostrategic power balance, or put another way, how much balancing behavior constitutes a power balance?
Using the first form of order as the basic definition throughout the book privileges a US pro-status quo (liberal, rules-based order) vision of Asian order. Thus, as that system comes under stress, if not collapses, disorder is created (with, at least from a US perspective, a negative connotation). Superficially, East Asia was a part of the post-Cold War order. But as Wan argues, most political economies in Asia certainly differed from Anglo-American style capitalism, and the US has tried to force Japan, South Korea, and China in particular to alter their domestic political economic institutions and practices to conform to the US understanding of liberal, rules-based order. Nor was much of East Asia particularly liberal. Again we come back to a question similar to the one in the previous paragraph, how much (or how little) conformance to the parameters of the putative order must there be for the order to be a defined order? Was East Asia ever as “orderly” as most of the essays in this book suggest? Is the US-led liberal, rules-based order a projection of the idealized American view of the way the world should be, as opposed to an actually existing order?
A number of the authors in this book focus on how important China is as economic partner for the other countries of East Asia, with supply chains running through China. But they tend to underestimate the degree to which the things they export to China are parts of products that get exported to the US, Europe, and developed Asia. They also do not discuss how much substitutability there is for Chinese exports.
Much has changed since this book went to press, which, of course, the authors can’t help. How much of this book retains its analytical power in the three-plus years since the original conference was held? Certainly, Sino-American rivalry/competition is unchanged, and seemingly has only intensified. Populism and limits on the idea of free trade are arguably entrenched elements of the US polity. But, China’s Belt and Road is greatly diminished, and its dynamic zero COVID policy is rearranging supply chains. It seems that China cannot or will not continue to be the economic engine of growth for Asia (and maybe no state can). This book is insightful for what it says about how Sino-American rivalry impacts East Asia. But the emergent order of East Asia is arguably constantly being redefined, and likely will continue to be for the foreseeable future.
David Bachman
University of Washington, Seattle