Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017. xii, 139 pp. (Graphs, figures.) US$145.00, cloth. ISBN 978-1-138-12020-4.
The China-India relationship will probably be one of the most important major power relationships in the coming century, and yet it is also one of the least studied. While we are seeing increasingly sophisticated contributions on the subject from Indian and Western scholars, Chinese scholars with expertise in the area remain scarce. There are few publications that provide real insights into Chinese strategic thinking about India. Lu’s new book is a welcome contribution to what one hopes may be more Chinese voices on the subject.
Lu approaches the relationship largely through the lens of national identity. Indeed, the China-India relationship is strongly affected by issues of national identity. Both China and India are civilizational states, with thousands of years of history, but also with new state structures that were established in the years after World War II. Each is very large in population and territory, naturally leading to a focus on internal issues. Each is now rising to power after centuries of decline and foreign domination. Each has particular preoccupations with the proper recognition of its status in the international system. Although they are neighbours, the Himalayas has historically divided them and they have relatively little experience in dealing with each other as modern states. In practice, their similarities divide far more than unite them.
Scholars such as John Garver have also long noted the particular asymmetry of the relationship: for more than fifty years, India has perceived China as a significant threat, but not the other way around. Lu endorses the idea that China’s “largely neutral (but sometimes confounding) perception of its neighbour indicates India is not a priority (at best) and in some cases insignificant (at worst) for China” (87; quoted from Shaun Randol, “How to Approach the Elephant: Chinese Perceptions of India in the Twenty-First Century,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 4: 211–216).
This asymmetry creates its own set of problems. While Indian analysts frequently obsess about China’s hostile intentions vis-à-vis India, Chinese analysts tend to downplay the significance of India in the international system and (importantly) its sensitivities and concerns. Chinese scholars who might be broadly sympathetic to India also tend to construct a narrative of wishful thinking: they often argue that the interests of China and India are essentially aligned, even if Delhi has some unfortunate misperceptions of China’s good intentions and mistaken aspirations towards a sphere of influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. According to this narrative, if only those misperceptions and misapprehensions could be dispelled, and India could resist the influence of a rather malign United States, then all would be well. India’s flirtation with the United States is only a passing fad and India—for its own good—will likely revert to its traditional policy of non-alignment. Lu reflects this wishful thinking in his book.
Lu devotes much of the book to setting out the separate national interests and identity of China and India, and unfortunately it is only in the latter part of the book that we get to an analysis of their contemporary interactions. Nevertheless, Lu provides some valuable insights.
On India’s concerns about China’s presence in South Asia, Lu acknowledges that India sees South Asia as its sphere of influence and its role to be that of the region’s security guarantor. But Lu argues that China does not want to cause trouble in the region: “China has no intention to separate South Asia by winning over one party to isolate the other, but China cannot refuse small countries in South Asia that seek to establish good relations with it…” (89). Apparently China is spending tens of billions of dollars all over South Asia because it just cannot refuse their requests.
On India’s relationship with the United States, Lu argues that while China expresses concerns about a possible US-India alliance, it realizes that it will not be easy to “draw” India into such an alliance. To this point, Lu quotes one of China’s state councillors: “India is a country of strategic independence. It will not be wooed or ordered about by anyone else” (90). The implication here being that India’s likely reversion to non-alignment and away from the US strategic orbit will eventually mitigate its concerns about China.
Lu argues that China’s national identity prescribes that peaceful economic development should be its main priority. This means that China wants to avoid conflicts with its immediate neighbours in order to foster domestic development. China’s intention in foreign policy is to have “win-win” relations with other countries in terms of achieving improved welfare. According to Lu, having a long-term, cooperative, and stable relationship with India is at the core of China’s India policy.
Lu acknowledges that although there are multiple streams of thought in India about China, India’s perceptions of China’s relations in South Asia are mainly viewed through a realist strategic and security lens, and so it will not be easy for India to cooperate with China on regional issues.
Overall, Lu provides a valuable presentation of Chinese views about India and China’s perceptions of its own (good) intentions in South Asia. It should be hoped that Lu’s work will form part of a more active and critical discussion among Chinese scholars about India, and the impact of China’s actions on Indian perceptions. Is it enough for China to say that it really just wants to promote economic development among India’s neighbours and so therefore India is mistaken about the strategic consequences of China’s actions? China has huge ambitions in the Indian Ocean region, and India is currently a gaping hole in those ambitions. In light of continual jostling between China and India in the Himalayas, and indeed all over South Asia, one wonders how Beijing actually plans to convince Delhi of its good intentions.
David Brewster
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia