Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022. xi, 348 pp. (Tables, graphs, figures.) US$35.00, cloth. ISBN 9780691167602.
From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia, authored by Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, examines the relationship between economic growth and political transitions in Asia. The book seeks to understand why some Asian countries have transitioned to democracy while others have maintained authoritarian regimes despite significant economic progress. The authors argue that economic development alone does not guarantee democratization. Instead, they emphasize the importance of political strategy and timing of reforms, demonstrating that authoritarian regimes can democratize from a position of strength rather than as a last resort during times of crisis.
In so doing, the authors critically reassess modernization theory, which posits that economic development creates the conditions for political liberalization, and engage with the broader literature on democracy and authoritarianism to explore the conditions under which autocratic regimes decide to implement democratic reforms—or not.
Using a comparative case study design and detailed historical overviews of twelve Asian countries that began the post-World War II period with non-democratic regimes, the authors trace the sequence of events and decisions made by elites in each country, identifying patterns and deviations that quantitative studies may overlook. While lacking the breadth of larger-n studies, this approach provides depth and context-specific insights, combining insights from political science, economics, and sociology to offer a well-rounded understanding of the democratization processes.
Overall, Slater and Wong present a compelling and parsimonious framework for understanding democratization in Asia. The book is highly instructive, and beyond the broader theoretical framework and causal argument, it serves as an informative and well-organized review of East Asian political systems in the postwar era. It is suitable reading for students, scholars, practitioners, and those simply interested in one of the world’s most dynamic regions.
The book is structured into nine chapters and a conclusion. The introductory chapter, “Democracy through Strength,” outlines the main argument and theoretical framework, including the concepts of victory confidence and stability confidence. The second chapter, “Shaping Developmental Asia,” provides the historical and contextual background necessary to understand the developmental trajectories and political and economic landscapes of Asian countries.
The rest of the book is organized into thematic chapters that group countries based on their political strength and patterns of democratization. The Developmental Statism cluster includes Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, characterized by ruling party-led democratization under conditions of economic strength and more or less unified conservative elites (chapters 3–5). Japan’s post-war democratization, Taiwan’s gradual transition, and South Korea’s more fitful but ultimately democratic path are examined for their theory-affirming value.
In contrast, the Developmental Militarism cluster comprises Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar, where democracy has been unstable and reversible (chapter 7). These cases highlight the significant role of the military in politics and how economic development affects political stability. The Developmental Britannia cluster, including Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, illustrates high economic development coupled with democratic avoidance (chapter 8). These regimes emphasize the maintenance of stability and control without transitioning to democracy, focusing on strategies that consolidate power and prevent democratization.
Lastly, the Developmental Socialism cluster features China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, which are characterized by strong centralized control and the avoidance of democratic reforms (chapter 9). The dominance of communist parties and fragmented elite structures are key themes in these countries’ political landscapes.
Wong and Slater’s primary theoretical contribution lies in their concept of “democracy through strength,” which revolves around victory confidence and stability confidence. Victory confidence refers to the authoritarian regime’s belief that it can maintain power through elections, while stability confidence pertains to the regime’s assurance that democratization will not lead to social instability. These forms of confidence often stem from sustained economic development and the resulting social and political stability. Additionally, the concept of “signals” is integral to their framework, where ominous signals indicate that authoritarian repression is failing, and reassuring signals suggest that democratization will not lead to disastrous outcomes.
The theoretical framework re-evaluates the relationship between modernization and democratization in Asia by asserting that economic growth, while necessary, is insufficient. It emphasizes that the political context, specifically the strategic decisions and perceptions of the ruling regime, plays a critical role. Regimes are more likely to democratize proactively when they possess both victory confidence (the belief they can win elections) and stability confidence (the assurance democratic reforms will not lead to instability). Signals play a role, too. They can be electoral, contentious, economic, or geopolitical, and the mix of these signals can shift a regime into a “bittersweet spot” conducive to democratic reform.
Taiwan serves as a paradigmatic example of “democracy through strength.” The Kuomintang (KMT) initiated democratic reforms from a position of enduring strength rather than weakness. By the late 1980s, Taiwan had undergone several decades of sustained economic growth under KMT leadership, resulting in a strong, stable economy and a politically stable regime. The decision to permit the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and lift martial law in 1987 exemplifies how the KMT’s confidence in its electoral victory and the stability of the nation facilitated a smooth transition to democracy. This process is detailed in the chapters focusing on Taiwan, illustrating how economic strength and elite cohesion can drive democratization.
By contrast, China did not concede reforms in 1989 due to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) being too weak. The authors argue that the CCP lacked the stability and confidence necessary for democratization despite significant economic growth. The Tiananmen Square protests highlighted the regime’s vulnerability and fear of losing control, leading to a violent crackdown rather than democratic reforms. This case, discussed in detail in the chapter on China up to 1989, underscores how a lack of perceived stability and confidence can hinder democratization, even in the presence of economic development.
In the conclusion, Wong and Slater emphasize that democracy’s success and stability depend not just on economic development, but also on political strategy, elite cohesion, and external signals. They highlight that even prosperous regions may resist democratization and demonstrate the complex and conditional relationship between economic and political factors.
Steven Denney
Leiden University, Leiden