The Routledge Indo Pacific Security Series. London; New York: Routledge, 2022. 228 pp. (Illustrations.) US$170.00, cloth; US$53.00, ebook. ISBN 9780429331541.
In Great Power Competition and Order Building in the Indo-Pacific, Frederick Kliem sets himself an ambitious objective in asking the following question: How can the stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific find a durable modus operandi, a regional order that is more constructive than confrontational?
Kliem’s answer is to create a new “regional equilibrium” through two order-building projects derived from both realist and liberal institutional traditions. The first is a strategic US-led constrainment of Chinese assertiveness and coercion, when necessary focused on denying Chinese regional hegemony. This strategy would have more limited objectives compared with the containment strategy pursued against the Soviet Union.
The second element is a multi-dimensional concept of partnership, consisting of engagement within ASEAN-led multilateral institutions and minilateral functional partnerships that include China on specific issues. According to Kliem, engagement maintains a degree of civility and habits of cooperation, great power dialogue, and functional mechanisms in order to meet future transboundary challenges.
Put together, these strategies would foster the creation of a new equilibrium, which in turn would allow a new regional order to gradually emerge. On its face, this is a reasonable proposal, even if some elements of Kliem’s argument may not fully stand up to closer scrutiny.
As a starting point, Kliem argues that the Indo-Pacific concept, and the Asia-Pacific concept before it, were creations of a hegemonistic United States, essentially shaping perceptions of regions to suit its own ends. This sounds reasonable. But having been closely involved in the debates about the Indo-Pacific that occurred around the region since Shinzo Abe first brought it to the fore in 2007, this author can attest to the inaccuracy of this interpretation.
In fact, it was the middle powers, first Japan and later Australia, which promoted the Indo-Pacific concept for their own national interests. The United States was left to play catch-up in this debate, ultimately adopting many of the ideas generated out of Tokyo, including its “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy. The point here is the importance of the middle powers in shaping thinking. Hegemony in material power does not equate with hegemony over powerful ideas.
Kliem also argues that despite the claims of many regional observers about a multipolar Indo-Pacific, the region is in fact a “qualified bipolar regional balance of power” for multipolarity. According to Kliem, true multipolarity is only achieved once more than two states are fairly equal in their overall capabilities.
Putting aside debates over questionable definitions, this approach severely limits a proper understanding of the dynamics of different parts of the huge Indo-Pacific region, and how those dynamics are likely to evolve in coming decades. Decision-makers in many South Asia countries, who spend their time balancing the demands of the two giants, India and China, would be surprised to learn that they are worrying about the wrong powers. Similarly, for many of the islands of the Pacific, where the United States has a minimal diplomatic or economic presence, their concerns principally involve dealing with the expectations of countries such as Australia, Japan, and China, not the United States.
The point here is that although the US may be indispensable to the regional balance, key decisions about the Indo-Pacific are not just being made by the United States, with the middle powers playing supporting roles. They are seeking to shape their strategic environment for themselves. Australia’s initiative in forming AUKUS, for example, might help reinforce US power, but its real significance is in strengthening Australia’s ability to pursue its own interests.
This trend will likely become even more evident in coming decades as the relative power balance shifts further away from the United States and more middle powers emerge, pursuing their own ambitions that are sometimes consistent with US interests, but can also diverge. The pursuit of multipolarity by countries such as India, and others, almost inevitably means that the United States won’t get to set the agenda. In the meantime, even the smallest of state actors frequently display significant (and, for some, irritating) agency in playing off larger powers against each other.
The second leg of Kliem’s proposed strategy, engagement with China, principally through reinforcing ASEAN-centred multilateral groupings, is also problematic. Kliem spends considerable time cataloguing ASEAN’s structural weaknesses and why it is unable to resolve problems within its membership (e.g., Myanmar), and the inability of ASEAN-centred groupings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum to contain competition among the major powers. Kliem argues that paradoxically, it is the weaknesses of ASEAN-centred groupings that make them attractive to other powers. Signing up to ASEAN-led multilateralism comes at little cost and creates no binding obligations on its members. Kliem argues that this makes ASEAN indispensable as the only neutral enabler of great and middle power dialogue in Asia.
Kliem acknowledges the value that smaller, flexible, minilateral partnerships can play in addressing particular issues, but argues that minilateral groupings should be seen as complementary and cannot replace ASEAN-led multilateralism. Without care, their exclusive nature could also have the potential to undermine the universal norms that minilaterals often seek to protect.
Kliem concludes that it is incumbent on ASEAN to proactively convince all stakeholders that any sustainable and peaceful balance of power will need to be anchored in a reliable multilateral architecture in order to maintain the conversation. This may be true. But on the other hand there is little or no evidence that ASEAN has the ability to achieve that objective.
In the meantime, until an effective new regional multilateral structure evolves, the hard work of maintaining a regional balance of power is likely to fall on US-led coalitions as well as other minilateral coalitions of willing middle powers. ASEAN centrality may be a useful rhetorical tool, but seems unlikely to be the basis of a stable new regional order.
This is an impressive book that asks the right questions, but it is not clear whether it provides the right answers.
David Brewster
The Australian National University, Canberra