Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2021. x, 217 pp. (Tables, figures.) US$75.00, cloth. ISBN 978-1-62637-945-9.
In reviewing academic writings, one gets tempted to criticize the outdatedness of their empirical contents. Whatever the fault for the lethal delay in production, original and in-depth analysis could breathe new life into outdated empirical material. Unfortunately, this book fails to offer fresh new perspectives.
The introduction briefly discusses the shortcomings of realist theories and the realist bias in the discussions of hegemonic shifts. The author, Shiraishi Takashi, instead employs analytical “eclecticism,” staying away from hypothesis testing within a single theoretical paradigm. Shiraishi also warns against too much preoccupation with institutions and instead calls for more attention to be paid to key individual leaders.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the key trends that characterize the ongoing shift in the global power balance. Nothing the author presents here is new. Shiraishi offers the following key variables to be considered for analysis: the relative decline of the United States and other developed countries, the rise of China, how a rising China is perceived, the coming of the “G-zero world,” the middle-income trap for emerging economies, and the rising expectations of the urban middle class. One important argument made by the author is that the United States (and the G7 developed world) does not have much time left to exercise political leadership in the rules-making for future global governance.
In chapter 2 Shiraishi discusses US strategy towards Asia from the post-Cold War to the Obama period and Chinese strategy towards its neighbours and the broader Indo-Pacific. The author’s analysis of China is well balanced, treading a middle ground in the polarized debate (often found in American academia/policy circles) between the China specialists who see numerous weaknesses in China’s ascent and the geostrategic realists who advocate strong containment against China.
Chapter 3 introduces Southeast Asia’s internal diversity at regional, national, and subnational levels, focusing on ethno-religious compositions, growth, urbanization, and income distribution. Key countries’ strategies are discussed, fusing the grand system-level analysis from chapter 1 with an analysis of unique national and domestic factors. The focus of this chapter is a discussion of how post-Asian economic crisis economic reforms and democratic transitions have interacted in each country and how the prevailing patterns shape that country’s relationship with China.
Finally, in chapter 4 Shiraishi discusses Japan’s place in the region. Its development focus in East Asia left a network of production that had to endure a major restructuring after the Asian economic crisis. The growing geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States offered an opportunity to realign the Japanese strategy with Obama’s Rebalancing to Asia strategy. Seeing Japan as a capable middle power, the author argues it should engage in the politics of power and balancing with the fundamental goal of transforming the US-centred hub-and-spokes system into a network of alliances. On international economic policy, it should play an active role in setting the rules of economic cooperation and free trade based on market liberalization (191–192).
The book is based on four lectures the author gave in Kyoto between May and November 2014. The author’s “focus on long-term national strategy alongside the structures and systems of state” (ix) was supposed to minimize the hardship of shooting a moving target when writing about current affairs. Discussion of the long-term strategies of the regional states is placed in the context of the growing geopolitical competition between the United States and China, which by now has become more pronounced than it was at the time of the author’s writing. Analysis of the “structures and systems” of state gives nuances to the explanation of the more-or-less hedging regional states under the allegedly bifurcating international system. Perhaps this domestic analysis is where the author could add value, but his strength varies across different states of Southeast Asia. On Indonesia (148–157), for example, the author is smooth, recalling major events without referring to journalistic reports, and offering useful insights. On Thailand (124–133) and Myanmar (133–142), the author relies on the works of other Japanese scholars but adds little to old journalistic commentaries.
The speech-based production of this book has resulted in inconsistent organization, despite some revisions. Some chapters have more rigorous academic referencing, while others have far fewer notes, and there are problematic instances of missing sources for direct quotes (54, 81). The alleged focus on individual leaders (declared in the introduction) is largely forgotten in the following chapters.
One good way to read this book is to excavate the author’s predictions and check them against the actual turn of events. In analyzing US President Barak Obama’s Pivot (Rebalance) to Asia strategy, the author foresaw trilateralization of the US alliances with Japan and Australia and further growth of networked security partnerships around this core (57). The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (adding India to the three) is not far off the author’s forecast. The author’s skepticism about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) playing a robust role in regional security affairs (103) amid the growing Sino-US rivalry was also on target.
Had the book been published in 2016, it would have offered good foresight, although it still would have missed the turbulence in US policy during the Trump administration. By 2021, the book’s sound foresights have become realities, and the questions it raises, like about the prospect for Myanmar after the 2015 elections, have been answered in a rather drastic way by the coup in early 2021. We see now that the Biden administration largely draws its Asia policy from the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. In hindsight, listening to the author’s original lectures in 2014 would have been an exciting experience.
Yoichiro Sato
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu