New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. xvi, 487 pp. (Maps.) C$38.95, cloth. ISBN 978-1-107-02069-6.
Sarah Paine, known for her earlier book that closely examined the First Sino-Japanese War, now presents us with an ambitious new book that is much more expansive in both scope and breadth, bringing forth a holistic view to the major conflicts that were fought in China (including Manchuria), beginning with the 1911 Chinese Revolution up to the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. One should note, however, that although the term “Asia” is part of the main title, it is readily apparent even from the very selection of 1911–1949 as the time period under study—not to mention the Chinese quotes appearing at the beginning of the chapter title pages—that her predominant interest lies with China. This is important to keep in mind, as it has a not-so-subtle impact on her narrative and also colours her overall understanding of the “Wars for Asia.”
Despite this, Paine’s comprehensive study does endeavour to transcend China and sets forth a multinational view of events by examining each conflict from the vantage point of Japan and Russia, the other major players in the region. Through this, she not only succeeds in showing the nexus that inextricably links each country through the string of conflicts, but also clearly points out the fundamental political aspirations and/or national interest objectives that served as the main driving force behind the decisions that were eventually made. By taking this approach, Paine is able to show us that that the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Pacific War (or the Great East Asian War to be more accurate), were not actually separate wars, but instead were merely threads that formed the same fabric. This “long war” thesis that she presents adds an interesting perspective, if not quite original, and does lend credence to her primary argument that these wars should be treated as a whole in order to grasp the big picture, which is that it was in fact a 38-year war.
But does Paine succeed in her goal of revising the Western orthodoxy that has preferred to view each war as a distinctively separate event? The answer is both yes and no. First of all, the truly multilingual and extensive bibliography (52 pages) attests to the seriousness of the scholarship as well as the author’s devotion to multiarchival research. This in itself is an admirable feat, and the multi-dimensional view that is presented does support the theory that the wars were invariably connected on many facets. However, when one steps back from the field of traditional military history, which has tended to make clear distinctions between individual wars and often presents only a single overarching vantage point, one sees that the thesis in itself is not new and follows neatly in line with recent scholarly trends in international history, namely to view the various major conflicts as “long wars,” such as the connection between the First World War and the Second World War, the Second World War and the Cold War, and so on.
Undeniably, major wars force drastic changes to the existing system, and it is therefore not uncommon for these changes to contribute to increased instability, which is then in turn resolved through conflict. Hence, although Paine’s argument may not have been previously applied to wars involving China—at least from the standpoint of Western scholarship—it does follow certain logic and thus is not particularly earth-shattering. Moreover, from the perspective of Japanese historiography, Paine’s interpretation has already been embraced by the academic left in Japan and has been touted as the “15-year-war thesis.” This view is in essence the historical equivalent of the big bang theory that unashamedly posits that war with the US became predestined the very instant the Manchurian incident blew up. While Paine is much too sophisticated to make such an over-simplified argument—after all, it is the contingencies that make history so interesting—and takes a more nuanced stance, the main thrust of her argument remains the same. While this linear view of history may have existed in the minds of a few military leaders, it certainly was not the case among senior diplomats and civilian leaders. By reinterpreting history while being fully cognizant of its final outcome, the power of hindsight can sometimes lead us to connect dots where in reality there should be no lines drawn at all.
In addition, the book also suffers from a few weaknesses. Returning to my first comment, a considerable knowledge gap exists when Paine writes about Japan versus China. Notwithstanding the textbook-like narrative that merely presents a standard view of events, her treatment of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy as being monolithic institutions is overly simplistic and misleading. As we know, there were various factions that competed for control over policy and this struggle had a critical impact upon Japan’s actions towards China. Furthermore, when the author writes about Tojo Hideki’s failure to commit suicide (he botches an attempt) and how his contemporaries frowned upon this, she fails to provide a deeper assessment that Tojo’s greatest service to his country was actually that he lived to die by the noose as a war criminal. In this way, he bore the blame for the war, and became an effective scapegoat for Hirohito. Digging deeper to show the complexities of events would have definitely led to a much more substantial book. And of course, a more substantial conclusion, one that actually synthesizes the main arguments of the book rather than offering a Wikipedia-like chain of biography entries on key individuals, would have also greatly benefitted the final product.
In conclusion, these comments are not meant to detract in any way from what is on the whole a serious undertaking that is also delightfully easy to read. The book contains a wealth of facts and can be handy when retracing the conflicts in China during the period in question. It also gives me a sigh of relief to know that history dealing with high policy still has room to exist in a field that remains enamoured with the marginal and abstract. The history presented in this book clearly has utility; current events taking place in Northeast Asia remind us that the region is still ripe for conflict. Faced with these stark realities, Paine’s book provides us with an important tool through which we can learn the lessons of the past. This in turn will hopefully allow us to plot a safer course in order to avoid any future wars for Asia.
Tosh Minohara
Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
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