New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2020. 363 pp. (Maps.) US$40.00, cloth. ISBN 978-0-300-23484-8.
In To Rule Eurasia’s Waves, Geoffrey Gresh delves into three factors—maritime geoeconomics, navalism response, and the quest for great power status—to examine power competition in maritime Eurasia between China, Russia, and India. Specifically, he uses cases on ports, roads, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and other infrastructure to demonstrate how geoeconomics drives power competition. Gresh focuses on the build-up of navies, the safety of SLOCs, and the expansion of naval bases to show how security plays a role in navalism response. Additionally, he shows that India may still want to operate in the current US-led international liberal order (ILO), while Russia and China want to alter, if not entirely replace, the current ILO.
Theoretically speaking, this book follows a realist framework. Gresh believes hard power (military capacity) and sharp power (economic co-opt and geoeconomics thinking) determine and explain the current power competition in the Eurasia maritime sphere. He cites Alfred Mahan throughout the book to show how the current Chinese, Indian, and Russian naval strategists and policymakers are also Mahanian in their thinking.
People may question Gresh’s argument because of his neglect of soft power—especially considering that “status” is a highly discussed concept in international relations and could be well incorporated into the constructivism logic—and the relatively silent role of international and regional institutions in his discussion. For instance, scholars have noticed that besides following the Mahanian logic of building a dominant navy, China is also developing its sea powers through an emphasis on the importance of domestic maritime governance and diplomatic coercion (Edward Sing Yue Chan, “Beyond Mahanianism: The Evolution of China’s Policy Discussion on Sea Power Development,” Asian Security [2021]). However, this would be an incorrect reading of this book. Gresh is not saying realist is the framework to explain the power competition; instead, using numerous examples and case studies, he argues that realist is a framework, and this Mahanian framework is fundamental and valuable because it is also what policymakers and military officers follow when making decisions. This realist-leaning logic is also in line with most literature in security studies. Saying this, people should bear in mind that institutionalism, constructivism, and other frameworks could also be helpful tools when researching this topic.
Methodologically speaking, Gresh’s book is comparative in nature. Eurasia maritime is divided into seven geographical regions: the Black and Baltic Seas (chapter 2), the Mediterranean (chapter 3), the seas of Southwest Asia (chapter 4), the Indian Ocean (chapter 5), the South China Sea (chapter 6), the East Asia region (chapter 7), and the Arctic (chapter 8). Gresh compares the different approaches utilized by China, Russia, and India in different maritime spheres and analyzes how these maritime spheres shape their respective strategies. For instance, compared with China, India lacks the economic power to expand its presence in Eurasia in terms of ports expansion and infrastructure building, and India lags behind China and Russia in its naval capacities to secure SLOCs and expand its basing footprint. However, India is fitted within the current ILO and has more Western allies such as the US and Japan. Russia and China, on the other hand, aim to alter the current ILO through different means. Russia’s fixation on military capacities drives its strategy, and its heavy reliance on resources to generate revenue means it needs China more than China needs it. China, the focus of this book, can wield its economic sharp power through its Maritime Silk Road projects, and there is a substantial and steady increase in its naval military capacities thanks to an increasing budget.
Gresh’s research is also rooted in history. This can be seen from his analysis of the historical background in each chapter and how he relies on historians’ accounts to detail the historical development in Eurasia. For instance, the historical legacy of Admiral Gorshkov, to a certain extent, could explain how and why Russia’s navy could be transformed “from a coastal force into a powerful nuclear-missile-carrying blue-water navy capable of confronting the United States” (29). History—especially the nine-dash line—also plays a significant role in explaining China’s dominant position in the South China Sea.
The comprehensive field research conducted for this book is impressive. However, some case studies may be misleading. For instance, Gresh uses the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota as a potential debt-trap case and suggests “China will likely establish Hambantota as a future military outpost” (161). However, the allegation of a debt-trap is inaccurate, and is more nuanced than people think (for instance, see Deborah Brautigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a Meme,” Area Development and Policy, 5, no.1 [2020]). Luckily, Gresh has presented many other cases, and people would generally agree with the direction of his argument even if they may disagree with some of his case selections.
To Rule Eurasia’s Waves contributes to the established but still growing literature of great power competition, security studies, and the geoeconomics and geopolitics of Eurasia. Though the book has a regional focus, its argument could be well applied to other littoral rising powers like Brazil and South Africa. It also has substantial implications for the current Western and ILO powers. If they want to keep the US-led world order and plan to use the Build Back Better World, Global Gateway, and other frameworks to counter the rising of China, they need to appreciate the importance of the Eurasia maritime sphere and understand how China, Russia, and India are operating in this region. This book further invigorates the discussion of hard and sharp power and re-emphasizes the significance of a realist and Mahanian framework. It is a must-read for scholars, policymakers, and anyone interested in the great power competition.
Yongzheng Parker Li
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver