Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2018. xviii, 206 pp. (Graphs.) US$39.95, cloth. ISBN 978-1-5017-1082-7.
Studies on “terrorism” have become one of the twenty-first century’s growth industries, with the term being applied to a wide range of circumstances for a variety of usually political reasons. The term terrorism remains particularly difficult to pin down, given its automatic connotation of illegitimacy to sometimes quite diverse actors, acts, and motives.
However, if one is to write in the field, the “terrorism/terrorist” indentifier is a useful one for signalling the subject, particularly when, as in Chernov Hwang’s case, the purpose is to explain rather than denounce. The subtitle of her book, The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists, is a more precise descriptor of its subject, if not as attention-grabbing as Why Terrorists Quit. The book itself is one of the better expositions on terrorism, being expressed in clear, non-judgmental terms.
Indonesia is the site for this study, given its long history of Islamist violence and that it is the world’s largest predominantly Islamic state. Moreover, Indonesia has produced its fair share of violent religious extremists, going abroad to fight as well as engaging in domestic conflicts and anti-state activities.
Such violence has figured throughout Indonesian history, initially as a rationale for anti-colonial struggles and later as the Darul Islam (DI) movement and its successors. Darul Islam was founded in 1942 with the goal of establishing an independent Indonesia as an Islamic state. Chernov Hwang briefly traces DI’s otherwise well-recorded lineage and explains how its various terrorist iterations developed in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Chernov Hwang’s study, between 2010 and 2016, focuses on groups that had been recently active, although identifies the disbanded Laskar Jihad as a “militia” rather than a terrorist organization. This then returns to definitional debates over the term terrorism, and whether other militias that have spread violence and fear in Indonesia were not also “terrorists.”
Chernov Hwang opens by describing one of her trips to meet with a so-called terrorist still committed to using violence. She writes of meeting with a notorious jihadist from the Poso, Sulawesi conflicts from the early 2000s, and is struck, as with others like him, by how ordinary he is. She also notes that, “If we want to understand jihadists, we must talk to them” (xi) and “attempt to build a relationship” (xii). The critically important yet much missed commonplace could be said to apply to all armed non-state actors.
One might suggest that, through such engagement, “terrorists” can be “disengaged.” Yet, as Chernov Hwang illustrates through her extensive interviews with former jihadists, the factors that lead jihadists (and others) to abandon violence are a consequence of a web of factors which may be externally supported or enhanced but are usually driven by more personal concerns.
The author outlines the key reasons why jihadists (and other violent non-state actors) disengage early in the book (9–13), then explores case studies to elaborate on these reasons. The key reasons for such disengagement, as Chernov Hwang notes, include personal reflection, changing personal relationships (including marriage, family, and social groups), disillusionment or disappointment with the organization, its methods or goals, the changing context of drivers for violent engagement, and shifting priorities of individual actors. These factors may exist alone or in combination, and may become cumulative.
Where disengagement can be externally supported is in helping individuals considering or already embarking upon leaving behind organized non-state violence. Jihadists and others, as Chernov Hwang notes, may return to violence if they are otherwise socially isolated, if violence is connected with income, or if the conditions that prompted violence and that had abated then return. Reinforcement of the reasons why violent actors disengage from violence, including building non-violent social relationships and other counter-balancing support structures, and finding other means of achieving underlying goals, may then assist with maintaining disengagement.
Of course, as Chernov Hwang points out, not all violent actors want to change; some remain committed to particular causes and regard violence as the most viable or appropriate method for achieving their aims. Similarly, some violent actors may pretend to have disengaged from violence in order to secure release from prison, for example, but return to violence once freed. Not discussed in the book is how some people are drawn to the explanations and violent propositions of grand unifying principles (be they religious or political) while in prison, although this seems less of a driver in Indonesia than in some other places.
Perhaps given its focus on individual responses, Why Terrorists Quit does not explore state institutional involvement in violent extremism, but for a brief reference (23) to the State Coordinating Intelligence Agency (BAKIN) funding a reunion of Darul Islam members. Not only was Darul Islam supported by BAKIN, and earlier by Indonesia’s Special Operations group (Opsus), theirs and others’ related activities were often facilitated by the covert operations section of the army’s Special Forces (Kopassandha, later Kopassus). This is not to mention the army’s support for Laskar Jihad and several other violent “militias” that could reasonably be called “terrorists.”
That aside, Chernov Hwang’s book should be required reading for all who have a professional interest in combating violent extremism, from policy makers to field agents. It is also an important study for others, particularly scholars, wishing to gain a better understanding of this troubling aspect Indonesia’s complex make-up.
Damien Kingsbury
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia